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1. Introduction  
Unemployed couples and those in which the male partner is frequently out of work and claiming benefits, are 
known to have higher rates of separation and divorce than couples in which one or both partners are in regular, 
paid employment (Blekesaune, M. 2008; Doiron and Mendolia.2011).  However, how and why unemployment 
and benefit receipt increase the risk of partnership dissolution is not fully understood and remains the subject of 
much debate.  In the UK, some politicians and policy analysts have highlighted the influence of ‘couple 
penalties,’ financial differentials in entitlement for means-tested benefits and tax credits between lone and couple-
parent families. These are claimed to encourage low-income couples, or families experiencing financial difficulty, 
to break up or to fraudulently ‘pretend to separate’ in order to qualify for higher benefit levels than they would 
otherwise be entitled to if they remained as an intact couple (Morgan, 2007; SJPG, 2007a; Centre for Social 
Justice, 2011). In fact, relatively little is known about the reasons for partnership dissolution among couples 
eligible for means-tested benefits, or the influence of the UK welfare system on family structure more generally, 
and the topic is both under-theorised and under-researched (Stafford and Roberts 2009).    
 
The wider qualitative study from which this paper is drawn sought to fill this gap. Using in-depth, face-to-face, 
retrospective interviews with a sample of 51 low-income mothers, the research explored how family formation, 
partnership dissolution and repartnering decisions were made in the context of benefit receipt and at different 
stages of the life course.  A previous article explored the way in which the rules governing eligibility for means-
tested benefits could potentially influence the decision to partner or repartner (Griffiths 2017). Focusing on a sub-
set of 26 mothers who had been married or cohabiting prior to becoming lone parents, this paper investigates 
whether eligibility for or entitlement to benefits or tax credits may have influenced the decision to separate or 
divorce.   
 
The paper begins with a brief exploration of the theoretical and policy context underpinning recent political 
discourse linking couples penalties with ‘family breakdown’ and partnership dissolution, before going on to 
review existing research and evidence.  The next section outlines the research methods for the wider study from 
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which findings here are drawn, together with details of the sampling frame used for the current article.  Empirical 
findings are then presented, followed by conclusions.  Policy implications are discussed in the context of 
Universal Credit (UC).  
 
2. The influence of the welfare system on ‘family breakdown’, separation and divorce 
Theories which claim the availability and generosity of means-tested benefits are implicated in changing patterns 
of family structure are strongly informed by the seminal work of U.S. economist Gary Becker.  Becker 
hypothesised that the choice between being married, cohabiting or living alone are influenced by the relative 
economic opportunities available within and outwith a union, taking into account the earnings of the woman, 
those of her (prospective) partner, together with any cash benefits to which she may be entitled as a single, 
married, or cohabiting woman (Becker, 1974).  Where means-tested financial help is conditional upon income 
levels, marital or partnership status or household composition, in so far as marrying, cohabiting, having a child or 
being a lone parent affects eligibility or entitlement, demographic behaviour can be conceived as being subject to 
the influence of welfare policies and systems (Halla et al., 2011).   
 
According to this perspective, the greater incidence of partnership dissolution and ‘family breakdown’ among 
groups eligible for means-tested benefits is explained with reference to the reduced economic cost of lone 
motherhood, separation and divorce.  Financial support for lone parents, it is argued, has allowed men to abandon 
their wives, partners and children in the knowledge that the state will step in to support them (Murray and 
Phillips, 2001).  Improved female earnings as a result of entitlement to in-work benefits are also hypothesised to 
have reduced the financial imperative for low-income women to remain in unhappy marital or cohabiting unions 
(Blau et al., 2002).   
 
Drawing on these theories, during the 1990’s, controversial U.S. social commentator, Charles Murray, forewarned 
the emergence of a welfare dependent ‘underclass’, arguing that the UK social security system had created a 
series of perverse incentives which encouraged unmarried motherhood and ‘family breakdown’ (Murray, 1990; 
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Murray, 1994). To Murray and his proponents, means-tested benefits that could be claimed by unmarried, 
separated and divorced mothers were said to be displacing the married, two-parent family as an institution within 
which to raise and socialise children (Murray and Phillips, 2001).  In advocating marriage as the policy solution 
to poverty, Murray’s thesis was summarily dismissed as thinly veiled ideology (Robinson and Gregson, 1992; 
Lister (ed), 1996) and, thereafter, scholarly engagement in the behavioural effects of UK welfare on family 
structure faded.   
 
In the period leading up to the 2010 election, the causes and consequences of poverty and the role of the welfare 
state were vigorously debated.  Within the Conservative Party, a number of policy documents produced by 
members and associates of the Centre for Social Justice, founded by Iain Duncan Smith, MP, (SJPG 2006; Centre 
for Social Justice, 2009; SJPG, 2007a; SJPG 2007b) proved to be highly influential in setting the tone and future 
direction of the party’s family and welfare policy (McKay and Rowlingson, 2011).  Comprising an eclectic mix of 
academic research, anecdotal evidence derived from ‘public hearings’ and opinion survey data, from these 
various documents emerged the proposal for Universal Credit.  Also featuring prominently as a key driver of 
poverty and ‘family breakdown’ was the existence of a so-called ‘couple penalty’ in the welfare system ( SJPG, 
2007a; Centre for Social Justice 2010b). According to this analysis, the growth of ’dysfunctional,’ ‘dissolved,’ 
and ‘dadless’ families was said to been driven by the very system of benefits and tax credits put in place to 
combat lone parents’ higher rates of poverty (SJPG, 2006: 89).  As part of a wide-ranging strategy to recalibrate 
the welfare state, the Coalition government’s policy solution to poverty was to change the structure the benefit 
system to reduce ‘welfare dependency’ and introduce measures to promote family stability  (Department for 
Work and Pensions and Department for Education, 2012).  
 
Challenging stigmatised representations of lone parents and benefit claimants as ‘welfare dependent,’ a 
countervailing strand of qualitative research has sought to bring the lived experience of poor people more to the 
fore (Macdonald and Shildrick, 2014; Patrick 2016).  However, the more contentious issue of whether the UK 
welfare system affects partnering behaviour has received comparatively little academic attention.  Unlike during 
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the 1990’s, recent discussion and analysis has therefore mostly taken place in right leaning policy think-tanks and 
in the tabloid press and broadcast media (Chapman, 2011; Centre for Social Justice, 2013).  While the paucity of 
empirical research may reflect a reluctance to confront questions about claimants’ agency in ways that might be 
construed as legitimising welfare dependency theories, limited evidence may paradoxically have contributed to 
the popular consensus these stigmatised discourses currently enjoy.  Poorly-evidenced views not only serve to 
perpetuate victim-blaming accounts of poverty but also undermine effective policy-making.  By addressing the 
issue of partnering behaviour in the context of benefit receipt, the research study from which findings presented 
here are drawn, aimed to help fill the evidence gap, thereby contributing to better- informed policy. 
 
3.  Couples penalties in UK means-tested benefits and tax credits 
The term ‘couple penalty’ is generally understood to mean the change in benefit and tax credit entitlement – 
typically a reduction - that can occur when two single people marry or begin to cohabit (Adam and Brewer, 
2010).  However, a couple penalty could equally be called a lone parent ‘bonus’ (Johnson, 2005).  A lone parent 
bonus can arise when a married or cohabiting couple separate or divorce and cease living together in the same 
household.  Couple penalties mainly affect low-income families with dependent children who are eligible for 
means-tested welfare benefits and tax credits.  They arise for several reasons.  Firstly, on the basis that couples 
who live together benefit from the economies of scale of sharing the same household, maximum entitlement for 
couples is less than double the amount payable to single people.  Secondly, some means-tested benefits take no 
financial account of the second adult in a household.  For example, couple and lone-parent families with the same 
number of children receive the same amount of tax credits and the same Universal Credit Work Allowance1.  
 
 A third dimension of UK social security that can financially disadvantage couples is the unitary, family-based 
system of means-testing.  Based on the assumption that married and cohabiting couples pool their income for 
mutual benefit, partners who live together cannot claim means-tested benefits or tax credits as individuals but 
                                                          
1 The UC Work Allowance is the amount claimants with dependent children (and some claimants with limited capacity for 
work) are allowed to earn before their entitlement to the benefit begins to reduce. 
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must rather claim jointly2.  Eligibility and entitlement is then assessed against the aggregated needs and joint 
income of the couple, rather than against each partner’s needs and income.  This contrasts with the UK tax system 
which largely ignores partnership status3.  All other things being equal, the combined income of a household 
comprising two adults with dependent children would therefore normally be less than the sum of their individual 
incomes if they lived in separate households (Adam and Brewer, 2010).  An unintended consequence of these 
aspects of UK social security is that it can be financially advantageous to claim benefits and tax credits as a lone 
parent rather than as a couple.    
 
By appearing to financially disadvantage couples who openly live together, some Conservative politicians and 
right-leaning policy think tanks have claimed that ‘couple penalties’ in the benefit system undermine marriage 
and committed coupledom (Draper 2007; SJPG 2007a).  Tax credits, in particular, introduced under New Labour, 
are perceived to treat lone parents more favourably than ‘traditional’ couples because no allowance is made for 
the presence of the second adult in a household (SJPG, 2007b).   A more stigmatising discourse claims that couple 
penalties encourage benefit fraud among couples who, in seeking to maximise their benefit entitlement, ‘pretend 
to separate’ or fail to officially disclose the presence of a partner (Chapman 2011).   
 
As many have pointed out, use of the term ‘couple penalty’ here is “often quite confused” (Lister and Bennett, 
2010: 98). The word ‘penalty’ is itself unhelpful since its pejorative meaning implies that differential entitlement 
to benefits between lone parents and two-parent families is somehow unfair or unjustified  (Adam and Brewer, 
2010).  In fact, differential entitlement is a long-established feature of UK social security.  That lone and couple 
parents are entitled to the same earnings disregard and top-up, has been a feature of in-work benefits ever since 
Family Income Supplement was introduced by Edward Heath’s Conservative government in 1971.  Paying 
couples benefit rates at less than twice the rate eligible individuals are entitled to is, moreover, intended to operate 
as an adjustment for the economies of scale that are assumed to occur when couples share the same household.  
                                                          
2 Similar benefit rules apply to couples without dependent children and to same-sex couples who live together. 
3 An exception is the married couple’s allowance.  Currently worth £238 per annum, its introduction by the Conservative 
government in 2015 can largely be seen as symbolic. 
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While it can be argued that  this is unfair to couples4, removing or reducing this differential would only have 
limited impact on the financial disincentive faced when a lone parent marries or starts to cohabit, or on the lone 
parent ‘bonus’ which can arise when couples separate. This is because what has narrowly been referred to in these 
debates as the ‘couple penalty’ more accurately describes the effects of joint means testing in which the resources 
and needs of married and cohabiting couples are aggregated (Lister and Bennett, 2010).  ‘Couple penalties’ would 
not in fact exist if eligibility for means-tested welfare were assessed individually, in the same way as tax liability, 
which treats married and cohabiting couples on the basis of their own income and circumstances (Adam and 
Brewer 2010).    
 
4. Existing research and evidence 
Despite the popular and intuitive appeal of ‘couple penalties’, there is a paucity of UK research which has 
examined its effects on partnering decisions.  To date, most studies have been descriptive analyses exploring the 
size and distribution of financial differentials in means-tested benefits and tax credits between lone and couple 
parent households, from which behavioural effects are then imputed or inferred.  Using a large representative 
sample of couples drawn from the Family Resources Study, Anderberg et al. (Anderberg et al., 2008) explored 
whether the UK welfare system subsidised or penalised couples who live together.  Using data from 1994–95 to 
2004–05, the analysis revealed couple penalties to be widespread and large; 20 per cent of couples faced a penalty 
of over £60 per week and penalties of more than £100 per week were not uncommon.  Penalties tended to be 
larger for couples with children and those with fewer educational qualifications.  Tax credits generated incentives 
in favour of family formation for some couples and disincentives for others, whereas Income Support generated 
only couple penalties.  Factors which may limit the usefulness of the findings include the fact that the analysis 
ignored housing benefits, assumed that the employment and earnings of couples were constant before and after 
separating, and ignored the economies of scale that are assumed to arise when two adults share a household 
(Stafford and Roberts, 2009).         
                                                          
4  The rule does not apply to claimants who share a household with other family members or with house mates, only intimate 
partners. 
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Using a similar methodology to Anderberg, the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) used a large representative 
sample of 14,000 couples with and without children and 15,000 single adults to estimate the hypothetical 
partnership penalty or premium facing a couple who separate, and also facing a single person if they were to start 
living with a partner (Adam and Brewer, 2010).  The research did not explore whether the families would be 
financially better or worse off as lone parents or couples; simply how entitlement to means-tested benefits varied 
according to family situation.  Nor did the methodology allow for exploration of the degree to which penalties and 
premiums actually influenced partnering behaviour.  Based on data from 2006–07 and the tax and benefit system 
in 2010–11, the analysis found that 95% of couples with children have a couple penalty. The average penalty they 
faced was £85 per week. Similar results were found for single people who marry or start living with a partner.  
Through estimating how net income and living expenses change when couples cease living together, Draper’s 
review of couples penalties (Draper, 2009) sought to address more directly the issue of whether couples would be 
financially better or worse off by living apart or together.  Using a set of stylised family types, the study 
compared the financial implications of couples living together or living apart.  The calculations took account of 
tax and benefits in different family situations and the additional costs of housing but no account was taken of any 
savings in utility bills or food arising from two adults living together.  The analysis found that 75 out of 98 
hypothetical couples would have been better off living apart than together.  As a group, single earner couples 
faced the largest penalties, while dual earner couples faced the least.  The mean penalty was £69 a week. He 
concluded that affected couples would, on average, have been 20 per cent better off by separating or living apart.   
 
A later study by Hirsch used a different set of stylised families and a different methodology to examine whether 
the UK welfare system provided a financial incentive for existing couples with children to separate (Hirsch, 
2012).   Adam and Brewer’s study, he pointed out, only measured income differences, without commenting on 
the extent to which these may be offset by differences in living costs.  Draper, on the other hand, took no account 
housing costs but did not factor in other economies of scale which might accrue as a result of shared living 
arrangements, for example food and utility bills (Hirsch 2012).  Hirsch’s study calculated whether a father, 
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mother and their children would be better or worse off living together than living apart using two benchmarks of 
being ‘better’ or  ‘worse off’, the UK’s Minimum Income Standard, and a measure based on the official 
government ‘equivalence scale’ drawn up by the OECD. Contrary to Draper, Hirsch found that, even though 
benefit income may rise when low-income couples separate, so do their living costs; previous studies, he argued, 
have either ignored or under-estimated the additional costs of running two households when separated, while 
under-estimating the cost savings that accrue from living as a couple.  He concluded that there is “no couple 
penalty in the benefits system” and that “splitting up would make families on benefits between 4 and 6 per cent 
worse off relative to their needs” (Hirsch, 2012a: 28).   
 
For all their valuable insights, findings based on a small number of stylised families are not statistically 
representative, nor do they fully reflect the wide variation in family circumstances (O'Donoghue and Sutherland, 
1999).  Results are also highly sensitive to the assumptions made regarding employment patterns and housing 
costs when couples separate (Stafford and Roberts, 2009).  As the Draper and Hirsch studies show, changing the 
assumptions on which the calculations are based can produce very different results.  More broadly, studies which 
merely document changing levels of household income and living costs in different household configurations tell 
us little about whether or not a couple’s decision to live together or to separate is, in actuality, affected by 
financial differences in benefit entitlement 
 
Impact studies exploring actual behavioural effects on partnering decisions are restricted to a small number of 
now out-dated econometric analyses which have produced similarly inconclusive and contradictory findings.  
Some studies found a strong link between benefit entitlement and the probability of partnership dissolution 
(Walker and Zhu, 2005), others only a weak association (Francesconi et al., 2009).  In a follow-up to his earlier 
study, Anderberg found that parents, among whom the largest couple penalties are generally found, were less 
responsive to financial incentives in the welfare system than non-parents (Anderberg, 2008).  However, the 
methodology did not address the reasons why.  Taken as a whole across these various quantitative studies, 
findings suggest that although differential entitlement to UK means-tested benefits between lone and couple 
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parent families may have some effect on partnership dissolution, their influence and role remains poorly 
understood.   
 
5. Research methods 
Based on face to face interviews with 51 low-income mothers, the wider study from which this paper is drawn 
used qualitative methods to help fill the gap in research evidence.  The study explored how the women made 
family formation, family dissolution and repartnering decisions in the period between 1997, when New Labour 
came to power, and 2013 when the study was conducted. In-depth, retrospective interviews investigated whether 
and to what extent eligibility for or entitlement to UK means-tested welfare may have influenced the decision to 
live with or apart, or to separate, from a partner or child’s father.  
 
Research participants were recruited via local schools and community centres and with the help of local family 
and housing support workers. Others were identified using snowballing techniques and personal contacts. 
Interviews took place in participants’ homes and community venues.  With participants’ consent, interviews were 
digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim before being loaded onto Maxqda, a software package designed to 
facilitate the organisation and analysis of textual qualitative data. Transcribed data were analysed using a 
hierarchical thematic coding schema generated inductively from interview transcripts and deductively from 
theory and policy discourse. 
 
Participants volunteered to take part in the research on the basis of informed consent according to the ethical 
guidelines of the Social Research Association (Social Research Association, 2003) and the British Sociological 
Association (British Sociological Association, 2002).  Ethical approval for the study was also secured from the 
University of Bath Research Ethics Committee.  
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5.1  Selection criteria and achieved sample  
Since economic theory suggests that the welfare system is potentially implicated in partnering behaviour mainly 
through its effects on earnings and household income, it was important to ensure that the sample included mothers 
with varied earnings and employment histories.  Participants were also sought from a variety of social 
backgrounds and with varying levels of education; restricting the sample to the poorest or most disadvantaged 
mothers could have risked generating self-fulfilling findings which feed into stigmatised discourses.   
 
The achieved sample of 51 mothers was drawn from different parts of Merseyside in the North West of England 
including neighbourhoods suffering from serious social and economic deprivation, as well as more affluent areas.  
All the women had all claimed UK means-tested benefits or tax credits on the grounds of being a lone parent and 
many had experience of claiming benefits jointly when married or cohabiting with a partner.  Of the 51 
participants, 26 had become lone parents through separation or divorce from a spouse or partner, 23 as a result of 
having a child when not living with a partner, and 2 had been widowed.  At the time of the interview, 20 of the 
mothers were currently or had formerly been married, while 31 had never been married.   Reflecting the 
qualitative nature of the research, a sample thus structured was not intended to be representative but rather 
capable of elucidating the many and diverse factors of potential influence underlying partnership decision-making 
and living arrangements. 
 
5.2  Sample frame of sub-set used for the current article  
Findings presented in this article focus on the circumstances surrounding relationship breakdown among a sub-set 
of 26 women who had become lone parents through separation or divorce from a spouse (15), or as a result of 
separating from a cohabiting partner (11).  Of the 15 mothers who had been married prior to partnership 
dissolution, 11 had since divorced, 2 were legally separated and a further 2 were informally separated.  Aged 
between 19 and 60, their social backgrounds and employment history were diverse, but all had been part of an 
intact couple prior to separating and claiming benefits or tax credits as a lone parent. Many women had since re-
partnered, some through cohabitation, others through a first or subsequent marriage, and some had become lone 
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mothers on more than one occasion.  20 of the 26 mothers had left school without progressing into higher 
education, but several had later returned to education or training after having their children.  All of the mothers 
had experience of paid work, although the extent of labour market participation and job type varied.  Reflecting 
the ethnic make-up of the local population, all but one of the participants was white, and all but two were British 
born. 
 
5.2. Limitations of the research 
Though a relatively diverse sample was recruited, findings are not statistically representative.  Further research 
using larger samples drawn from different geographic areas would help to validate and broaden the findings 
beyond this particular group and local context.  A retrospective approach to interviews also carries the risk that 
participants may proffer inaccurate, distorted or one-sided narratives.  Here, though, it was precisely mothers’ 
personal accounts and subjective interpretations of events and actions that the research was interested in 
uncovering.  Other limitations relate to the size and complexity of the subject matter.  The multiple pathways 
through which welfare systems could potentially influence partnering decisions makes for a highly complex 
theoretical and empirical picture.  Through providing some new insights into couple dynamics and mothers’ 
partnering decisions, the research makes some tentative in-roads.  However, a single face-to-face interview with a 
small sample of mothers can only hope to scratch the surface of what is multifaceted and complex field.   
 
6. Research findings 
6.1 Ignorance of eligibility and entitlement 
The research found that, prior separating, very few of these mothers had been aware of any financial differentials 
in benefit entitlement between couples and lone parents, or of the extent to which eligibility or entitlement varied 
by family type. Indeed, awareness of what benefits they may have been entitled to receive as lone parents, or of 
the amount they might get, often only emerged after couples had parted.   
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It was a long time after we separated anyway that I knew that you could get such things as tax 
credits. I didn’t even know I was eligible.  (Wendy, 43, two children aged 18, 15) 
 
Attitudes concerning the relative generosity or perceived unfairness of welfare payments applicable to different 
family types were thus predominantly formed post separation, strongly countering notions that ‘family 
breakdown’ had somehow been  contrived as a means of gaming the welfare system.  Nevertheless, although the 
decision to end their relationships was said by most mothers to have been unrelated to benefit eligibility or 
entitlement, concern over how they would manage financially after separating did however affect the timing of 
dissolution.  Lack of awareness about benefit entitlement if they separated meant that some mothers remained in 
unhappy or abusive relationships much longer than they might otherwise have done.  Sheer desperation 
eventually drove some to leave their partners without knowing how they would support themselves and their 
children.   
 
Working full-time and a joint mortgagee on the family home, Shelley assumed she would not be entitled to 
financial help with housing costs so delayed leaving her partner  because she had no savings and did not earn 
enough to pay rent on an alternative property.  With her mental health in decline, she resolved to leave her 
husband regardless of the consequences 
 
I was really unhappy for about two years before I left but it was financial reasons that stopped me 
leaving … the thought of being on my own with no money, supporting two children, it just really 
did stop me from leaving him … because I had nowhere to go, I didn’t have any money …,  In the 
end I got that desperate I didn’t care what happened, I just had to get away from him … At the time 
I left I didn’t know how I’d manage and I didn’t care ... because I felt like I was going to have a 
breakdown if I stayed …  I just had to get away.  (Shelley, 43, two children) 
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It was many months before she sought advice as to any benefits she might be eligible for.  Finding out she was 
entitled to Housing and Council Tax Benefit enabled her to finance the cost of divorce proceedings, she conceded, 
while remaining adamant that she would have left her husband irrespective of any eligibility.  
 
6.2 The search for emotional and financial stability 
Strongly contesting the idea that they had engineered or ‘pretended’ to dissolve their partnerships in order to 
claim benefits as a lone parent, separating to secure emotional and financial stability ‘for the sake of the children’ 
emerged as a dominant theme.  With a serially unfaithful and financially reckless partner, establishing a stable 
home life for her three children had been the driving factor behind Nina’s decision to leave him, not the ability to 
access financial help; in fact, as a non-European national, she had no eligibility for benefits.  Though later 
awarded leave to remain and eligible to claim lone parent benefits, at the point of separation, Nina had little idea 
of how she would support herself and her children.   
 
My reasons for leaving [my partner] were entirely unrelated, couldn’t have been more unrelated to 
benefits… We split up … but [I was] unable to access any benefits because I didn’t have my leave 
to remain …. I had no idea how I’d support myself….  I couldn’t work, I had three young 
children….  I wasn’t able to access the welfare system, but I still left….  I didn’t have many choices 
...  but you just get on with things. (Nina, 46, three children) 
 
Though financial concerns were at the forefront of her decision making, and grateful for the help the welfare 
system later granted her, he was  adamant that neither eligibility for nor entitlement to benefits had played any 
part in the decision to leave her partner.  
 
Recounting the circumstances of her marriage break-up, Sandra too, strongly challenged the notion that the 
separation and her subsequent claim for lone parent benefits has been contrived or motivated by the prospect of 
financial gain.  However, money matters and debt did strongly feature:   
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One of the reasons we split up … one of the big things was money!... He had a gambling addiction and it 
turned out we were in a lot of debt which I knew nothing about because he dealt with all the financial side 
of things.  (Sandra, 29, one child) 
 
The betrayal of trust she felt ended her marriage and, at the time of the interview, the couple were in the process 
of divorcing.  She regretted the split, but it was entirely unrelated to benefit entitlement, she insisted.   
 
6.3 Inequalities of finance and power in couples 
Inequalities of power and income within couples also proved to be particularly salient to dissolution decisions.  
Even when the mother was earning and contributing financially to the household, male partners often exerted 
disproportionate influence and control over the family’s economic resources.  Such inequalities were a frequent 
caused of conflict which, in some cases, contributed to relationship breakdown.  Prior to becoming pregnant, 
Kirstie had worked full-time but soon after the birth, her baby was diagnosed with cystic fibrosis.  Giving up 
work to care for her child, she found herself financially dependent on her partner. Having previously earned her 
own income, restricted access to her partner’s salary and Working Tax Credit became a source of growing tension 
and the couple argued bitterly over his spending habits, culminating in domestic violence.   
 
I felt like it wasn’t fair, we were living together, it should have been our money … not his money, 
but he didn’t see it like that, he [saw] it as his because he earned it, it’s his money … So he gave 
me very little … If I did spend money it was just on the baby … but it started getting bad … I was 
like .., ‘you’re wasting your money on beer and … we’ve got to get nappies’  ... So we started 
arguing a lot more and then he hit me a few times… I probably should have thought of how I would 
manage but I just wanted to get away from him. (Kirstie, 21, one child) 
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In fact, caring full-time for a child with a serious health condition, she was eligible to claim Carer’s Allowance 
for herself and Disability Living Allowance for the child, but unaware of her entitlement, she did not submit a 
claim until two years after she had separated. 
 
6.4 Restricted access to the family’s benefit income  
For non-working mothers with an unemployed partner claiming out-of-work benefits, the added strain of being a 
dependent on a partner’s claim was an important contributory factor in relationship breakdown.  Restricted access 
to the jointly awarded benefit income, rather than any theoretical monetary gains that might arise as a result of 
partnership dissolution, was cited by several mothers as a key reason for the deterioration in and subsequent 
ending of their relationships.  An especially problematic aspect of claiming as a couple was enforced financial 
dependency on  an unemployed male ‘breadwinner’ who prioritised his own needs and personal spending above 
that of his partner or children.  Lack of access to the joint benefit income paid into her partner’s bank account, in 
combination with domestic abuse, was a key reason for Alice’s relationship breakdown:  
 
We were claiming benefits together because I informed the Jobcentre I was living with him.  We 
got JSA but it all had to go into his account… so he had all the money … any money he had left 
over had to go on weed or whatever he wanted for him or whatnot, or alcohol, so I didn’t really 
have anything, no money at all … When he actually turned round and hit me, I left. 
(Alice, 24, one child) 
 
As the day to day managers of the household budget but with little or no income of their own, these mothers were 
expected to get by on whatever amounts of money their partners deemed appropriate and chose to give them.  
Sarah’s husband was frequently unemployed, and though she worked part-time to boost the family’s low income, 
he pocketed a disproportionate share of the household’s benefit income for his own personal spending.  His casual 
earnings from odd jobs were treated as personal income, rather than distributed or spent for the benefit of the 
family.  His financial selfishness, Sarah recounted, was a major factor in the ending of her marriage.  
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The money we got [claiming] as a couple, he always had to have a chunk of it, like his spending 
money, but if he went off and did an odd job [for cash], that was his money as well… I’d … have to 
like budget money for two weeks but he still had to have a chunk of it for him to do what he wanted 
with it.  … I’d have to make do with what he left.  (Sarah, 53, two children) 
 
Some mothers disclosed that, because their partners had been the main jobseeker, as a ‘dependent partner’ on the 
claim, they had been unaware of the amount of benefits awarded to meet the needs of the family.   
 
I didn’t realise what he was getting for us money wise … until I sorted it out myself … because he 
used to lie about financial things … I think he applied for [sickness and disability benefits] when 
he lost his job… I didn’t even know I was down for it … because he dealt with the money side of 
things. (Shelley, 43, two children) 
 
For mothers whose options for paid employment were limited by childcare responsibilities, the hardship caused 
by a partner’s profligacy or controlling behaviour was particularly acutely experienced.  Being the ‘dependent’ on 
a male partner’s claim had left some with little spending power and virtually no income of their own.  With no 
access to the benefit income her husband claimed on behalf of the family, to secure some personal income, 
Catherine started part-time work.  She relished the social contact and financial independence that earning her 
own, albeit very modest, income gave her, but because her wages reduced the family’s benefits, her husband soon 
put a stop to it.   
 
Working was … a huge bone of contention because I wanted to work  ... but [my husband] didn’t 
want me to work.  He was very possessive, very insecure, assumed that I would be sleeping around 
… One Christmas I got a job … on a conveyor belt ... [it was] mind numbing ... but it was … my 
little bit of independence and money and it was getting me out of the house, but he put a stop to 
that … because it was going to affect his benefits.  (Catherine, 49, five children) 
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Left with no income of her own, she told of how being the dependent partner on her husband’s claim had 
ultimately contributed to her divorcing him: 
 
Having a joint claim5 became one of the reasons why we divorced … He was claiming our benefits … He 
told me he was going for a job interview…  I subsequently found out that he’d used one week’s benefit 
and drunk it all …  I was then left trying to support all of us and feed all of us for a fortnight – five 
children and two adults - on one week’s money… One particular Christmas Eve he didn’t come back till 
the day after Boxing Day.  He left us with no gas, no electric and no food in the house and the children 
and I for Christmas dinner had a tin of biscuits, because I had no money, nothing. That, amongst other 
things, was the reason why we divorced. (Catherine, 49, five children)  
 
6.5 Joint bank accounts  
Having a joint bank account provided no guarantee that both partners had access to the benefit income. Layla and 
her partner claimed Jobseeker’s Allowance jointly and had a joint bank account, but he controlled the finances 
and she rarely used her bank card or accessed the account to withdraw money.  Trusting him to manage the 
pooled benefit income landed Layla in debt for the first time when she discovered that he had allowed the account 
to go overdrawn without her knowledge or consent.  Her partner’s lack of trustworthiness in handling the family’s 
finances was cited as a contributory factor in her decision to separate.   
 
All the money that we got, it went into ... a joint account … I hardly used my bank card … it was 
him who carried you know the bank card around, and I found out afterwards that it was 
overdrawn, he was in debt with the overdraft … I didn’t know we had an overdraft… it spiralled 
                                                          
5 Joint claims for Jobseekers Allowance were introduced in 2001 and were mandatory for unemployed couples born after 1957 but only for 
those with no dependent children.  The Welfare Reform Act of 2009 legislated for the extension of joint claims to couples with children.  
However, this pre-dates the era to which the participant is referring.  The term ‘joint claims’ used here and elsewhere by some others 
usually refers more generically to claiming jointly and being the ‘dependent partner’ on a couple claim made by a ‘main claimant.’   
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out of control from there … that was the only debt I ever had … I got the blame for it, even though 
I knew nothing about it.  (Layla, 23, one child) 
 
Lilly had a joint account in which she and her husband pooled their earnings and Working Tax Credit.  Violent 
and controlling, her husband refused to allow her access to the money, giving her a small housekeeping allowance 
instead and monitoring her spending to ensure any surplus was returned to the ‘pot.’   
 
I didn’t deal with the money at that stage. Although we had our joint bank account… he used to 
check receipts, so if I went shopping, I had to give him the receipt and then the money went back 
into the pot.  (Lilly, 42, two children) 
 
Though desperate to leave, concern over how she would afford to pay the rent if she moved out acted as a 
powerful deterrent.  Opening a secret savings account, her plan was to build up enough money to pay the deposit 
and rent advance needed to establish an independent household. 
 
I was trying to save up for… a month’s deposit and a month’s rent ... My mother would send over a 
little bit of money  … so I had my own little separate bank account, a secret bank account! … My 
runaway account! And then unfortunately the bank account was found … I had to give it all to him 
…   Then I opened another little post office account, learnt to ... really hide things well ... and then 
started again from scratch.  (Lilly, 42, two children) 
 
Her plans took an unexpected turn when, following, a serious incident of domestic abuse, she and her children 
were removed to a place of safety by the police.  Her employer kept her job open throughout this difficult 
transition and, once settled into her own flat, she ended her claim and returned to work full time.   
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6.6 Financial abuse 
Among this group of mothers, stories of controlling behaviour and domestic abuse were not uncommon.  Having 
previously claimed benefits independently, Melanie regretted giving up her lone parent status by moving in with 
her new, unemployed partner.  When he was sanctioned for signing on for benefits late, the household began to 
slide into debt. Later, Melanie was forced to abandon their shared home for a women’s refuge because the 
tenancy was in joint names and her partner refused to leave:  
 
He left some horrendous bills and arrears …  He’d lock me out of the house, he’d take my car, then 
he’d lock me in and take the car… I’d have to ring the landlady and say ‘I’m locked in or out, 
please can you help’ and she’d say ‘... I can’t because he’s on the tenancy as well, it’s joint, so I 
can’t do anything without him agreeing’…  It went to court to get him out the house because … his 
name was on the tenancy … and the benefits were actually paying for both of us together ... The 
landlady wouldn’t give me a tenancy to give to the benefits with just my name on ... so we had to go 
to a refuge ... It was horrendous ... an absolute nightmare. (Melanie, 38, five children) 
 
Even though she did not personally receive any of the Housing Benefit paid to her partner, as a joint tenant 
Melanie found herself jointly and severally liable for the rent arrears which, three years after separating, remained 
outstanding.   
 
6.7 Better off as a lone parent? 
While there was no evidence that partnership dissolution was incentivised by the availability of lone parent 
benefits, having left their partners, several mothers did acknowledge they were financially better off.  Less due to 
the generosity of the benefit system, frequently it was owing to the parsimoniousness or profligacy of their former 
partners.  Mothers who had left a controlling or financially abusive partner were often shocked at how much 
better off they were after separating.  One married mother recounted how, only after having separated did she 
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realise how paltry her housekeeping allowance had been and how little of her husband’s earnings had been 
redistributed within the household: 
 
He paid all the bills and he gave me a wage and I had the family allowance … he just give me 
enough money to live on for food … When I went onto benefits after we split up, I was on the same 
money as he give me … I was quite shocked to see how mean he was, because I was on the same 
money as that man was giving me when we were married! ... He kept me on a very tight rein, which 
I didn’t realise until I went onto benefits ... He was meaner than the bloody benefit system!  (Nadia, 
59, three children) 
 
Although there was typically less money overall going into the household, several women said they felt better off 
as lone parents due to having personal control over the family finances, as well as being better money managers 
and less self-centred in their spending patterns than their partners had been.  Because their partners had often kept 
a disproportionate amount of household income to themselves, though modest, the money they had at their 
disposal as lone parents was therefore often in excess of what they had available to spend when living as a couple.   
 
 [When we were married] I’d try and get the money out of him for extra food … but it wasn’t easy 
… because he said he was working and I wasn’t, I was an at-home mum and he was actually 
slogging his guts out … [After separating] because I was responsible for the finances, it made a 
huge amount of difference to me … It probably wasn’t the case that I’d got more money but it was 
because I was able to manage it myself, I felt a little bit independent  … We might have been better 
off before as a family but obviously he was siphoning it off wasn’t he?  (Beatrice, 40, three 
children) 
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8.  Conclusions and discussion 
Findings from this research indicate that, although financial issues often dominated these mothers’ accounts of 
relationship breakdown, there was no evidence that dissolution decisions were incentivised by the prospect of 
higher benefit payments.  Though mothers’ financial concerns played an important role in decisions around the 
timing of separation, whether they would be eligible for lone parent benefits or how much they might get, was 
rarely at the forefront of their minds.  Regardless of the different circumstances contributing to relationship 
breakdown for individual couples, what lay at the heart of these mothers’ accounts was the search for emotional 
well-being and a desire for economic stability. Having separated, many mothers continued to struggle financially, 
but being economically independent and able to exercise financial autonomy and control over the household 
income, modest though it may have been, at least offered them some means of ameliorating the precarious 
economic situation most found themselves in, and of establishing a more stable environment in which to raise 
children.   
 
That, prior to separating, very few mothers had been aware of their eligibility for benefits, or of any differences in 
entitlement between lone parents and couples, was strongly supportive of their assertions that the decision to 
leave a partner had been made independently of any possible entitlement to welfare benefits. Nor was there any 
evidence here of contrived ‘family breakdown,’ suggesting that mothers were somehow complicit in fabricated or 
fraudulent claims, by ‘pretending’ to separate for reasons of monetary gain or to avoid working.  This is not to 
claim that lone parent benefit fraud does not exist, nor that some couples might choose to live apart, or present 
themselves as such, in order to avoid the effects of family means testing6, only that among this group of mothers 
who were married or openly cohabiting prior to separating, eligibility for or entitlement to lone parent benefits 
played no role in the decision to end their relationships.  
 
                                                          
6  Evidence that some lone parents may prefer to live apart from a partner, or present themselves as such, together with 
discussion of the circumstances and reasons why, is addressed in a separate paper (Griffiths, 2017).  
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Other aspects of the welfare system, however, clearly did play a part.  A mother’s restricted access to the 
household income when claiming benefits or tax credits as a couple was particularly apposite, so too was a 
partner’s tendency to withhold a disproportionate amount of the family’s benefit income, especially among 
mothers whose earnings potential was restricted by low skills and the presence of (young) children.  The 
perception that a partner or father was not providing for his family, or that benefit money awarded for the children 
and family as a whole was being wasted or expended on personal items before rent and important household bills 
had been paid, was thus a more common reason for relationship instability than financial hardship alone. Rather 
than simply the absolute value of household income or the aggregate monetary value of benefits a household may 
be entitled to, more influential in decisions affecting partnering dissolution was thus the extent to which the 
female partner had access to, and some level of control over, the family’s income and benefits.  
 
The assumption that relationship difficulties associated with financial issues are only about the lack of money in a 
household was thus shown to be overly-simplistic.  In this research, although low household income, debt and 
intermittent earnings were common sources of stress and relationship conflict, financial disputes were rarely ever 
only about the amount of money going into the household.  At the heart of relationship discord, and of greater 
relevance to couples’ disputes than low or inadequate household income, was who had control over and access to 
the money, and how it was distributed and spent.  Joint accounts provided no guarantee that both members of the 
couple had access to the monies contained therein.  On the contrary, regardless of whether earnings and benefit 
entitlements were paid into a separate or a joint account, female partners often experienced difficulties accessing a 
fair share of household income.  Adding a further dimension to gendered analyses of intra-household finances 
(Burgoyne 1990, Pahl, 1995, Vogler, 1998), of greater relevance to these couples’ disputes and more salient to 
partnership dissolution than simple lack of money, was unequal power and control over the jointly awarded 
benefit income.  Also resonating strongly with previous research (Goode et al.,1998, Lister et al.,1999), in this 
study, who in a couple received which benefits, who had access to them and how benefit income was pooled, 
managed, distributed and spent mattered a great deal to family stability.  In these respects, to the extent that the 
welfare system reinforces financial dependency on a partner and limits the economically weaker partner’s access 
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to household income, the structure and administration of means-tested social security benefits can be seen to be 
having an important contributory effect. 
 
9. Policy implications 
As the UK moves to the full implementation of Universal Credit, findings from this research are timely. 
Extrapolating from this study, findings here provide evidence in support of concerns raised that paying UC into 
only one account could potentially reinforce the economic dependency of married and cohabiting women 
(Bennett and Annesley, 2011, Women's Budget Group, 2011).  Lack of independent income and increased 
dependency on a male partner could, in turn, increase the scope for financial abuse and coercive control, trapping 
some women and their children in violent or abusive relationships (Sharp, 2008,  Howard, 2018).  Similar 
concerns have been expressed in respect of women whose partner has a drug, alcohol, mental health or gambling 
problem (Rotik et al., 2011).  The single monthly payment could also risk increasing rent arrears and evictions if 
money intended for rent is withheld, mismanaged or spent in other ways by one member of a couple.  Joint 
claimants could find themselves in an invidious position: legally liable to pay the rent but unable to access that 
part of the UC payment intended to cover housing costs. 
 
By providing new empirical insights into the unintended ways in which the design and administration of social 
security benefits can indirectly affect relationship dynamics in couples, findings strengthen the case in favour of 
reforming Universal Credit in ways which increase the financial independence of women and men who live 
together, or would like to.   The Scottish government has been consulting on different ways in which UC could be 
paid to couples, 7 for example by splitting the benefit equally by default or by allocating the full amount, or a 
larger percentage of the award, to the partner with primary caring responsibility.  In Northern Ireland joint-claim 
couples can choose either to have the UC award paid into a single or joint account, or equally split between two 
bank accounts.  However, in England and Wales, alternative payment arrangements for couples remain at the 
                                                          
7 The devolved governments in Scotland and Northern Ireland have some limited flexibilities over the way in which UC is paid. Claimants 
in Scotland, for example, can choose to have their award paid twice-monthly and to have the housing element paid directly to their 
landlord. 
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discretion of a Department for Work and Pensions decision maker and only in proven situations of domestic 
abuse or serious financial mismanagement8.  
 
Universal Credit thus sends deeply contradictory messages to women and couples who live together.  That 
claiming UC can oblige one member of a couple to be financially dependent on the other, and subject to the 
consequences of his or her partner’s behaviour, flies in the face of UC’s stated policy aims of promoting self-
reliance and supporting claimants from ‘welfare dependence’ to independence.  If further in-roads are to be made 
in terms of ensuring that means-tested social security benefits facilitate the economic empowerment of all 
claimants, addressing such fundamental contractions will be key.    
                                                          
8 In January 2019, Amber Rudd, the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions made a commitment to ensuring that more UC payments go 
to the main carer in couples with children, though without providing any details of how this would be implemented, or when.  
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/universal-credit-personal-welfare 
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